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Social Media Narratives as Political
Fan Fiction in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election
Pekka Kolehmainen
Imagine  that  you’re  standing  in  a  multiplex,  holding  a  ticket  for  either  of  two
movies that are about to start at the same time. The first is a plodding, predictable
flick you’ve sat through twice before and didn’t like. The second is a film that every
reviewer agrees is one of the worst things to ever hit the screen, but you haven’t
seen it, and there’s at least a chance they’ll turn out to be wrong, because they’re
wrong about everything all the time. How many of us are going to take our chances
on the second movie?i
 
1. Introduction
1 With these words, Matt Bei of Yahoo News closed out the election season, as the United
States chose to go with the second movie, albeit not decisively—and, some would say, on a
technicality. He reiterated a point he had made previously during the primaries: that the
prevalent mood of the election was slanted toward discarding the safe and boring in favor
of excitement and even danger.ii He not only invoked this often-repeated characterization
of 2016, but also likened the entire electoral process to an affair of entertainment. It was
portrayed as a popular cultural show to be consumed, rather than an event that could
change the course of the country.
2 There is nothing particularly new about the idea of elections as affairs of performance
and narrative. It is a well-worn thought, supported by research, that they involve selling
a story to the voting audience. This is a story of the country, the candidate, and of the
policies,  issues,  and ideologies they represent.iii As Molly Andrews puts it,  “politics is
nothing if not a stage for competing stories to be told about the same phenomena.”iv
Therefore, what set the 2016 electoral season apart the most was not the presence of
narratives, but rather the extent to which they were distributed, performed, and even
shaped within social media.v If the election was indeed a movie, then social media served
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as  an  increasingly  important  site  where  it  was  produced  and  acted  out,  as  well  as
received, evaluated, and transformed by the users. 
3 In this article, I will present an argument about the entanglement between social media
and the electoral narratives of the 2016 election. I  approach social media as a site in
which people came together in a struggle to make sense of what the election was about
and what its prevalent narratives were.vi Ultimately, I see it as a system of communication
governed by what Ulrike Klinger and Jakob Svensson have called “network media logic,”
which  allows  one  to  account  for  its  particularities  without  falling  into  determinist
assumptions of technology shaping communication as such or of communication being
freed of all technological and commercial constraints.vii I see it as part of a hybrid media
system, theorized by Andrew Chadwick, where several different types of media, each with
their own operational logics, coexist and interact.viii Approaching social media in this way
makes  it  possible  to  account  for  its  societal/cultural  dimensions,  as  well  as  its
technological and commercial aspects, without assigning one dominance over others. In
adopting this approach, it is not in my interest to argue one way or another about the
“influence” that social media may have had on the election or its results. Not only is such
an effect difficult to demonstrate, it also adds undue distance between the two. As Simon
Lindgren and others have argued,  it  is  increasingly problematic to sustain a division
between being “online” and “offline,” with virtuality being “an inescapable dimension of
sociality.”ix Therefore,  to  separate  activity  in  social  media  into a  detached sphere of
existence whose impact on the “real” we must constantly demonstrate appears to miss
the point. 
4 Focusing  on  the  ways  in  which  matters  of  time  and  varying  temporalities  became
involved in electoral narratives online, I see narratives as ways of assigning significance
to specific events by weaving them together into a cohesive sequence in service of a
larger sense of story.x In politics, they are the ways in which individuals make sense of
what is happening and by which they situate themselves within larger societal patterns.xi
Seeing how this involves connecting the past to the present with a looming sense of a
future, time—already since the work of Paul Ricœurxii—has been an integral element.xiii
Mark Currie has emphasized the need to understand narratives not simply as ways of
creating connections between past events in order to plot our path to the present, but
also as being intricately tied to the anticipation of an envisioned future. Currie describes
anticipation as “a mode of being which experiences the present as the object of future
memory.”xiv While Currie’s focus is on fictional narratives, the principle applies to politics
as well, as politicians invite potential voters to see themselves as part of a movement that
will  alter  the  course  of  history  itself.  As  such,  narratives  can  be  seen  as  a  form of
“worldmaking” by which disparate events are brought together into a cohesive story-
world through the application of performative power.xv 
5 In looking at how these narratives are created, shared, and shaped online, I employ an
idea presented by Jason Wilson,  who suggests  that  one way of  approaching political
engagement online is to see it as a form of fandom or even the act of writing fan fiction.xvi
Seeing  how Karen  Hellekson  and  Kristina  Busse  have  described  fan  fiction  as  being
perpetually in progress and forever changing (rather than authored top-down into a state
of completeness), this approach allows me to view social media as a site where narratives
are stories in process of being created, as vast numbers of users were constantly taking
the materials produced by the candidates and by other media entities (the “canon” in this
mode  of  production)  and  weaving  them into  evolving  narrative  frameworks.xvii In  a
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manner reminiscent of crossover fan fiction where different fictive universes are brought
together,  the  political  events  and  actors  of  the  2016  election  were  placed  into  new
character positions and narrative conventions, drawn particularly from popular culture,
which served as a secondary repository of “canon” imagery, in order to facilitate a certain
understanding of the campaign and its significance. The transformative nature of this
practice allowed users to easily discard those elements they found unfavorable in their
candidate and focus on those that supported the story being built. I therefore view fan
fiction primarily  as  a  mode of  production,  the mechanisms of  which can be used to
examine the workings of politics in social media. But before setting off to examine the key
candidates through the presented framework of inquiry, I need to delve a bit further into
the role of imagination in the formation of narratives in the 2016 election.
 
2. From Alternative Realities to Narrative Imagination
6 “How can we still be speaking of ‘facts’ when they no longer provide us with a reality that
we agree on?”xviii asked William Davies in his August 2016 column for the New York Times.
With this, he contributed to the debate on whether the success of Donald Trump meant
that we had moved toward a “post-truth” era where truth no longer matters. Davies’s
idea was that U.S. society had lost a collective, cohesive sense of a shared reality due to
social  media providing an uninhibited deluge of facts (both real  and falsified),  which
people were able to pick and choose from in creating those stories and versions of “the
real” with which they felt most comfortable.
7 As with most things dubbed as “new,” there are definite grounds to argue whether “post-
truth” is simply a new word for an old phenomenon. The presence of lies in politics has
never been a rarity, as remarked on by Hannah Arendt in 1967: “No one has ever doubted
that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, as far as I
know, has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues.”xix Politics has always
involved selling an idea not by its merits, but rather the story that gets spun around it.xx
Therefore, the particularity of the 2016 election lay in how stories that previously would
have  been  told  in  spatially  contained  settings  to  limited  audiences  could  now  find
resonance within online communities across the country. Unlike systems operating under
“mass  media  logic”—a term used  by  Klinger  and Svensson to  describe  media  where
content is produced by professionals, filtered by gatekeepers, and consumed in spatially
and temporally  confined settingsxxi—network media  allowed competing stories  of  the
same phenomenon to be produced at will and circulated freely, in a variety of narrative
configurations, which campaigns and professional pundits could only attempt to seize or
influence. The alternate “realities” described by Davies suggest a prevalence of narrative
formations so distinctly different that they could no longer find any resonance with one
another,  essentially  having  produced  fan  fictive  narrative  worlds  with  wildly
contradictory framing for the events that helped produce them.
8 In  everyday  parlance,  to  identify  something  as  a  “narrative”  is  to  reveal  it  as
manufactured. The word implies leaving out facts which might have worked to disrupt
the proposed understanding while privileging or indeed fabricating others to support it.
In  my  approach,  however,  narratives  are  ubiquitous  in  our  daily  lives  and  not  by
definition “false”  (or  “true”).  They are  instead attempts  to  make sense  of  things  by
imposing a structure on sequences of events.xxii As Barbara Czarniawska points out, there
are no structural differences between fictional and factual narratives; this, she argues,
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can  be  seen  as  a  source  of  the  power  they  hold.xxiii Politically,  individuals  position
themselves by relating their  personal  narratives of “how the world works,  how they
explain the engines of political change, and the role they see themselves [in]” toward the
“larger  cluster  of  national  stories,  within  which  individuals  position  themselves,
explicitly  or  otherwise.”xxiv Rather  than  a  mode  of  disinformation,  narratives  are
therefore  a  “mode  of  knowing.”xxv In  social  media,  the  performative  function  of
narratives is emphasized as individuals add their voices to its evolving, dialectic space. By
subscribing  to  specific  stories,  users  become  participants  in  certain  networked
communities.xxvi As  social  media  communication  is  often  fractured  and  limited,  for
example, by constraints of the platforms, what we find are not necessarily full narratives
in a traditional sense, but rather allusions to such. Therefore, users in essence invoke
narratives rather than construct them per se. 
9 In describing what she calls “the global imagination,” Shani Orgad has illustrated the role
that media representations have in feeding us material on which our imagination
operates. She sees that this global imagination is “enabled through, cultivated by, and
emerges via an ongoing process of symbolic construction of the real and the possible in
image and narrative.”xxvii I see networked social media as a primary site for this kind of
cultivation. In this, I follow the lead of Ingrid Hotz-Davies and others, who have theorized
that  the  Internet “is  a  mirror  whose image  is  an  imagined  and  fabricated  one,  a
conglomerate of stories of how and what we fantasize.”xxviii In following the different
forms of political fan fiction circulating around the 2016 election, one can thus gain a
sense of the differing strands of fantastic imagining taking place around the political
struggle. Indeed, the relationship between reality and its imagined possibilities forms the
core political narratives in general.  According to Molly Andrews, “political  narratives
engage the imagination, not only in constructing stories about the past and the present,
but  in  helping  in  articulating  a  vision of  an  alternative  world.”xxix These  alternative
worlds are essential  for campaigns to differentiate their message from those of their
rivals and for creating narratives that “matter.” As Jan Hanska has argued, successful
political narratives require gravitas and a sense of high stakes.xxx In his study of Barack
Obama’s 2008 campaign, Jeffrey Alexander has called this the “hinge of history”: 
To become a hero, one must establish great and urgent necessity. A hinge is created
in history and the candidate inserted into that break. Heroes are constructed by
shoehorning a political actor into world-historical time. It’s about narrating time,
about  building  a  new  temporality  that  is  radically  discontinuous,  and  about
weighting the imminent break with immense significance. The hero’s opponent is
so dangerous that electing that person will plunge the nation into apocalypse.xxxi
10 To construct this hinge, one needs to successfully appeal to the imaginations of the public
and use this to create a distinct sense of temporality that spans from the past through the
present to the future. This is what Andrews refers to when she describes imagination as
the bridge between “the real” and the “not-yet-real.”xxxii It is the means by which we are
able  to  extrapolate  from our  current,  daily  reality  an alternative  vision that  can be
accomplished through the political  choices presented by the candidates.  Yet she also
points out that political narratives need to have certain “landmarks” one can recognize,
or  else  they appear  too bizarre and foreign.xxxiii Social  media can serve as  a  site  for
struggle over these landmarks, as new configurations are constructed and legitimized
while others are articulated as foreign. 
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3. Seizing Time and Performing Narratives
11 When attempting to  assess  the level  to  which Twitter  engagement  could be  used to
measure electoral success in the 2012 Republican primaries, Dhiraj Murthy discovered
that  certain  candidates  appeared more  resistant  than others  to  fluctuations  in  their
Twitter popularity, regardless of their electoral success. From this he drew the conclusion
that their ability to develop a “buzz” online might be the result of “a certain level of
Twitter savvy or ‘Twitter capital,’” which he likened to Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of “cultural
capital.”xxxiv Amanda Hess of Slate made a similar point in December 2015, when she noted
that while Hillary Clinton’s social media team was working hard to appeal to millennials
by  adopting  a  playful  and trendy vocabulary,  her  rival  Bernie  Sanders  succeeded in
having his fans do all the work, creating a fandom-like engagement culture online while
keeping his own Twitter feed largely centered on the issues.xxxv 
12 Having examined the social media strategies of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney in the
2012 election, Daniel Kreiss has argued that the performative application of power online
and  a  keen  sense  of  timing  were  essential  to  the  success  of  Obama’s  social  media
campaign.xxxvi While Clinton’s social media strategy struggled early on, it later became
much more effective, particularly on this front of “seizing the moment.”xxxvii The best
example of this is no doubt the most retweeted tweet of the election. In response to
Donald Trump’s disparaging tweet about Barack Obama’s endorsement of Hillary Clinton
in June 2016, her account tweeted to Donald Trump: “Delete your account.”xxxviii The post
was  successful  and impeccably  timed,  firing  back within minutes  of  Donald Trump’s
original tweet. It displayed the kind of wit and playfulness that permeates social media
while simultaneously playing on Donald Trump’s widely criticized habits of Twitter use.
xxxix 
13 In contrast, Trump’s response came almost two hours later and did not receive nearly the
traction: “How long did it take your staff of 823 people to think that up—and where are
your 33,000 emails that you deleted?”xl While not as well in tune with the ebb and flow of
social  media,  Trump’s tweet also held a resonant message.  Despite the work done by
Clinton’s social media team, the appearance of inauthenticity never ceased to be an issue
for her. She lacked “Twitter capital,” which appeared to work much in the same vein as
the more general performativity of political narratives described by Jeffrey Alexander:
the strings had to remain out of sight for the performance to work.xli While the social
media  excitement  around  Bernie  Sanders  had  the  appearance  of  being  natural  and
spontaneous,  Clinton  appeared  more  manufactured,  an  image  further  amplified  by
initiatives such as the super PAC “Correct  the Record.” This  was a self-styled “rapid
response operation,” which in April 2016 announced it would spend a million dollars to
“engage  in  online  messaging  both  for  Secretary  Clinton  and  to  push  back  against
attackers on social media.”xlii The existence of such a super PAC gave legitimacy to doubts
around the motivations of each fervent online Clinton supporter.xliii Essentially, looking at
social media narratives through the framework of fan fiction production, one can argue
that  having  “social  media  capital”  served  to  reinforce  the  authored,  top-down
interpretations of political events (the purported “canon”), while the lack of such eroded
the credibility  of  certain authorial  positions  and thus  made the political  story  more
susceptible to being overrun by fan fictive interpretations.
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4. History and Heroism in the Making of the “Canon”
14 Much  like  fostering  social  media  engagement,  the  establishing  of  certain  narratives
therefore takes more effort (or “capital”) than others, and eventual success is determined
by a complex set of  interrelations between the narrative and its social  context.xliv At
certain  times,  specific  stories  gain  more  resonance  than  others.  Matt  Bei’s
aforementioned metaphor about the election as a choice between two different movies—
one we have seen and deemed boring, the other said to be horrible and yet fresh to our
eyes—draws  on  this  idea.  In  narrative  politics,  the  creation  of  a  rupture  in  the
progression of history helps in formulating a resonant story around the campaign. The
candidates  with  the  most  social  media  buzz  (whether  negative  or  positive)—Donald
Trump and Bernie Sandersxlv—were also the candidates who most effectively represented
such a  rupture.  Likewise,  according to the research conducted and published by the
TrackMaven marketing analytics firm, the most engaging social media content by the
Clinton team were the posts that emphasized her campaign’s historical significance.xlvi
15 For a political narrative to function, one needs to articulate each of the three steps: the
past,  the  present,  and  the  future.  For  Clinton  in  particular,  each  step  had  inherent
problems that she had to overcome. On a national level, she was the representative of the
status  quo,  making  any  break  with  the  Obama  administration  inherently  difficult.
Clinton’s early attempts at leveraging such a break with her potential  to be the first
female president largely proved ineffectual, particularly among young, white women.xlvii
This resembled the issue John McCain faced in 2008, when his status as the “warrior
candidate”  proved to  be  the wrong type of  hero for  a  war-weary country  facing an
economic downturn.xlviii On a more personal  level,  Clinton faced the issue of  being a
highly public figure, which—while positive in terms of name recognition—meant her past
was filled with prior characterizations (and character attacks) by political opponents and
pundits alike, effectively hindering her ability to assume new narrative positions.xlix She
faced similar issues in 2008, when her attempts at rewriting her public character became
an often-repeated media narrative in itself.l 
16 According to Jeffrey C. Alexander, to turn themselves into heroes politicians must “create
meaning by looking back to the past from the present and by projecting the plot’s next
act into the future, all at the same time. In their earlier lives, heroes were tested and
suffered,  usually  on  behalf  of  something  greater  than  themselves.  In  the present,
however,  their suffering and their causes will  be redeemed.”li This sort of biographic
narrativity has been very prominent in political campaigns. By telling stories, politicians
have rooted themselves in historical time and turned themselves into protagonists in a
tale.  However,  the 2016 election proved different,  particularly  in  regards  to  the two
candidates most buoyed by their social media buzz: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.
Both their campaigns, especially in social media, operated on a very different sense of
narrative time, and both are excellent targets for analysis that sees political engagement
online through the lenses of fandom and fan fiction.
17 As Michael Kruse of Politico argued in July 2015, Bernie Sanders’s personal history had an
unusual role in his campaign. The candidate consistently refused to talk about himself,
choosing instead to address the political issues driving his campaign. This is why Kruse
called him “the known unknown”: someone whose presence was more about his actions,
both in the present and the past, than about his persona.lii This sense of an uncomplicated
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history greatly contributed to his image,  especially among his supporters.  As Nathan
Heller of the New Yorker estimated in August 2015, Sanders’s supporters were drawn to his
stability: one could easily project his present-day character onto history, finding largely
the same man with the same ideas.liii Social media reinforced this point, as a number of
memes showed Sanders “then and now,” side by side or in sequence, exhibiting the same
opinions and the same political rhetoric across time.liv His character was portrayed as
static, unchanging, and thus unyielding. This contrasted with videos and memes which
drew attention to changes in Hillary Clinton’s character, such as the viral YouTube hit,
“Hillary Clinton lying for 13 minutes straight.”lv The video not only highlighted changes
in Clinton’s political stances, but also emphasized the idea of rupture in her personal
narrative. Instead of giving her the benefit of biographical history, where changes occur
over time, the video portrayed Clinton as someone who formulated her character entirely
within the present, in line with what she felt to be popular at the time. These sorts of
mobilizations of the historic past are an elementary part of a hybrid media system, as old
media clips become archived online and thus can be transformed and used in the creation
of new narrative formations.lvi Thus, they form a ready-made repository for contesting
the validity of specific narratives, whether these are authored by the official campaigns,
representatives of the mass media system, or by average users in their more fan fictive
accounts.
18 However,  Bernie  Sanders’s  characterization  likewise  contained  a  tension  that  would
manifest in different interpretations of his overarching political story. This tension was
deftly  illustrated  by  Edward-Isaac  Dovere  and  Gabriel  Debenedetti  of  Politico,  who
described the campaign in its final days as split between those staff members who blamed
Sanders’s more aggressive maneuvers for the campaign’s ultimate failure and those aides
who felt that they had exhibited too much restraint. Dovere and Debenedetti described
Sanders as “convinced… that he’s realizing his lifelong dream of being the catalyst for
remaking  American  politics.”lvii Continuing  their  argument,  Jack  Shafer  saw  the
differentiating  factor  between  “the  egomania”  of  Sanders  and  the  more  traditional
candidates  as  being  “his  revolutionary  heritage.  When  Sanders  says  ‘the  struggle
continues,’ his time frame is not the campaign season, it is perpetuity.”lviii What Sanders’s
campaign’s narratives drew from was a sense that it existed in the service of history, with
Sanders positioning himself as the catalyst for a shift toward a new age. However, for his
supporters it was often the appearance of lacking any personal motivations that made
him the most endearing. For them, there was a quality to Sanders’s campaign in which he
did not appear motivated by internal desires, but by the momentum of a historic shift
which  demands  action,  with  his  being  an  almost  replaceable  part  of  the  equation—
something  that  Nathan  Heller  called  Sanders’s  “cause-and-direct-effect  rationale  for
stepping in.”lix
19 Much of Sanders’s heroic narrative was not performed as much by him as by people
participating in the numerous online initiatives around him. In traditional accounts of
fan fiction as a creative practice, it has been the prevalent idea that fan fiction writers
“fill in the gaps” in existing universes or “elaborate upon and extend the narratives and
characters  of  a  world.”lx Natalia  Samutina has  expanded on this  by emphasizing fan
fictive practices that do not simply add to a world, but radically transform it.lxi
20 For  Bernie  Sanders,  Twitter  accounts  such  as  @BernieWanCanobi  or  @PoliticoPotter
engaged in crossover-style narrating of the political campaign by using references to Star
Wars and Harry Potter,  respectively,  to add layers of  mythos around their  preferred
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candidate. In both cases, Sanders was depicted as the mentor character (Obi-Wan Kenobi
or  Dumbledore),  a  hero-maker  archetype  whose  primary  function  was  to  guide  and
empower the actual hero of the tale—who, in this instance, were his supporters. Time was
integral to such depictions, as these mentors represented a bygone era and often had to
pass away in order for the hero to excel. Nathan Heller likewise noted that one of the
alluring aspects of Sanders’s candidacy was that he appeared “out of place,” effectively
transcending history and serving as a conduit between the “corrupted” present and the
era  of  revolutionary  optimism  lost  to  time  that  was  the  1960s.lxii Therefore,  to  his
supporters  Bernie  Sanders  appeared as  a  candidate  of  both the past  and the future,
empowering them in their fight against the present. 
21 Meanwhile, accounts such as @SassySenSanders presented another side of political fan
fiction. They imagined alternative versions of their preferred candidate, in this instance
one capable of delivering snappy comebacks and pointed responses, which many Sanders
supporters—especially online—were frustrated not to see coming from their candidate. In
a sense,  the Sanders  campaign had succeeded so well in articulating their  “hinge of
history” that his supporters questioned why he refused to take a stronger stance against
his political opponents. For example, in their analysis of the Democratic primary debates,
the panelists of the progressive online news and commentary network The Young Turks (
TYT) would regularly lament on Sanders not taking as aggressive a stance as they would
have liked.lxiii
22 It is worth examining one instance where this changed. In the Univision Miami debate,
Sanders delivered a very effective line, which turned out to be the most tweeted of the
night. In reference to a recent comment by Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein about the
potential dangers of his candidacy, Sanders said, “I am dangerous… for Wall Street.”lxiv
The reaction of the TYT panel on the debate livestream is noteworthy in itself, as the
commentators exploded in wild cheering at the delivery of the line. TYT’s owner Cenk
Uygur yelled repeatedly, “Goddamn right you are!” until shouting: “I am the danger! I am
the  danger!  I  am the  one  who knocks!”lxv The  video  not  only  shows  the  sports-like
reaction of the panel, but displays narrative layering occurring in real time. Uygur’s first
reaction was to affirm the one-liner. To him, it represented Sanders stepping up his game,
taking the step that Uygur had argued he should, and thus finally assuming the mantle
his  fans  had  been  eager  to  bestow  upon  him.  What  immediately  followed  was  a
connotative connection of the line with one of the most iconic scenes in the TV series
Breaking  Bad,  where Walter  White  affirms his  moral  and narrative transformation by
telling a story about a man opening the door and getting shot. His line, “I am the one who
knocks!” signifies the transformation of the character from victim to perpetrator, from a
mild-mannered chemistry teacher to the drug-lord Heisenberg.lxvi
23 #HeisenBern became a Twitter hashtag, a recurring meme, and a T-shirt design. While it
might be tempting to dismiss this as mere pop-cultural play without deeper meaning, one
cannot help but reflect at the ease with which the role of Walter White—a deeply flawed
anti-hero who over the course of the series sheds even the last vestiges of morality and
decency as part of his transformation—was ascribed to Bernie Sanders, a candidate for
whom a major part of his allure had been the appearance of historic stability and purity,
innocence,  and  standing  as  the  “last  honest  man  in  politics.”lxvii There  was  thus  a
fundamental tension in Sanders’s narrative between the rhetoric of unity/unification and
that of revolution. One can read Sanders’s campaign as a constant struggle between the
ego and the id, with social media serving as a site of fantastic envisioning of a Bernie
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Sanders ruled by the latter. At the Democratic National Convention, these two versions of
Bernie  Sanders  clashed,  as  he was  booed by his  own supporters  upon delivering his
endorsement of Hillary Clinton for president.lxviii For them, this was an act of betrayal
against  the fan fictive narrative in which they had become so deeply invested,  with
Sanders ultimately “selling out” their rebellion and joining the evil empire.
 
5. Hybrid Temporalities of Donald Trump
24 Meanwhile, for Donald Trump, one of the key elements in helping build his “social media
capital”  was  the  sense  of  immediacy which permeated his  social  media  presence.  In
contrast  to  Clinton,  whose  social  media  outlets  were  carefully  strategized  and
coordinated,  as  pointed  out  by  multiple  experts  over  the  course  of  the  election,lxix
Trump’s tweets appeared off the cuff and instantaneous, a point that was reinforced by
stories such as the Washington Post’s data analysis of tweets written by Trump himself
versus  his  staff,  which  showed  notable  differences  between  the  two.lxx The  contrast
between the two approaches and the value they carried for their respective supporters is
well illustrated by an exchange between two Twitter users, as part of a comment chain
responding to Donald Trump’s previously mentioned tweet on Clinton’s sizeable social
media team:
User1: ‘@realDonaldTrump it’s not often that I say this, but lol u mad’
User2: ‘@User1 @realDonaldTrump at least he writes his tweets lol’
User1: ‘@User2 @realDonaldTrump ‘at least he writes [remarkably ignorant] tweets
[that almost anyone would be ashamed to have written] lol’’
User2: ‘@User1 @realDonaldTrump at least he writes [not an argument] tweets [not
an argument] lol’
User1: ‘@User2 ‘at least he is the author of his woeful opinions’ is kinda a textbook
bad argument though honestly’
User2: ‘@User1 you gave two opinions, I gave facts.’lxxi
25 The argument embodies key elements of the 2016 election. The Clinton supporter (User1)
cared more about the message than the messenger. Importance was placed on what was
said rather than the act of saying itself. The Trump supporter, meanwhile, stripped the
message away as entirely meaningless. It did not matter what Trump said, so long as
something was being said and it was Trump who was saying it. This was the only fact that
mattered, and anything else was “just” opinion. The exchange echoes the theory posited
by Salena Zito of The Atlantic and commonly circulated across media: “The press take
[Trump] literally, but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally.”
lxxii For  his  supporters,  therefore, Donald  Trump’s  character  and  narrative  were
effectively elastic, freed of constraints placed upon them by both meaning and history,
and flexible enough to be placed into narrative formations where he did not fit based on
his  persona  and  habitus  alone.  Being  capable  of  simultaneously  exhibiting  wildly
contradictory understandings of reality, he thus became a vessel in which his supporters
could invest their narrative hopes. 
26 In a way, one of the more intriguing explanations for this elasticity was already presented
in September 2015 by Judd Legum of ThinkProgress, who discovered insight in the work of
the literary theorist  Roland Barthes.  He drew on Barthes’s  essay on the spectacle  of
wrestling, which focused on the type of choreographed, dramatized wrestling that in the
U.S. eventually culminated in the WWE and other professional wrestling organizations,
with which Donald Trump himself has also been involved. Legum saw Donald Trump as a
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show wrestler, performing his moves against opponents involved in a different type of
contest and thus unable to effectively counter his assault.lxxiii For Barthes, this kind of
wrestling  stood entirely  apart  from other  types  of  combat  sports,  particularly  in  its
relentless focus on the spectacle and on remaining locked in a perpetual state of the
present, with no history and no future. Unlike in a story, where disparate moments in
time web together  to  form a  line  across  history,  with  a  past  and a  present  and an
anticipation of a future, in Barthes’s analysis of wrestling, each moment contains within
itself all passions and meaning without any need to draw connections or lines to other
expressions.  For  the spectator,  what  mattered  was  to  “abolish  all  motives  and
consequences.”lxxiv Much like with the Trump supporter quoted above, the raw action
itself—the act of acting—counted more than its ramifications or motivations.
27 For  Donald  Trump’s  campaign,  Twitter  became  a  place  of  real,  visceral  action.  He
transcended the binary division between reality and virtuality, where online speech is
depicted as fundamentally different from and secondary to face-to-face communication.
lxxv Social media became a site where Trump operated in the immediacy of the present,
unbound  by  the  conventionalities  of  traditional  campaigning.  The  logic  of  Trump’s
candidacy  can  therefore  be  best  described  by  Andrew  Chadwick’s  definition  of  the
ontology of hybridity: “Hybridity is inevitably associated with flux, in-betweenness, the
interstitial and the liminal. It is about being out of sync with a familiar past and a half-
grasped future.”lxxvi This “out-of-syncness” depicts Trump’s character very well,  as he
appeared  to  operate  unburdened  by  his  past  actions  and  statements,  with  each
“candidacy-ending” scandal fading away with little effect.lxxvii The quickened temporal
pace of the network media logic and the hybrid media system appeared to contribute
toward  this,  as  Trump  was  able  to  continue  his  performance  at  an  erratic  speed,
uninhibited by the conventional temporal cycles of political campaigning, as exemplified
by his habit of late-night tweeting.lxxviii Misha Kavka and Amy West have also identified
this manner of temporality as the determinant temporal mode of reality television, the
logic of which can be seen to permeate much of Trump’s campaign due to his own past in
the television genre.lxxix Reality television, they argue, is a genre wrapped in an unending
sequence of consecutive moments, stripped of a sense of time invested with history. It is
thus a form of programming that creates both immediacy and intimacy, continuously
playing out a “perpetual now.”lxxx In a similar fashion, Aaron J. Petten has examined the
narrative logic of televised professional wrestling and found it most closely resembling a
soap opera. Instead of having an overarching, larger narrative conflict, the story pattern
contains  multiple,  simultaneous,  and  mutually  independent  conflicts,  operating  in  a
cyclical, seamless manner kept fresh by a steady stream of twists. Each immediate conflict
serves as “only a marker, another segment, in the ongoing and open narrative continuum
of wrestling’s seamless history.”lxxxi Accordingly, Donald Trump used his Twitter account
to perpetuate an endless cycle of conflicts with his opponents.
28 In Petten’s account of wrestling, the goal of the programming is to produce a “multiform
narrative structure” in which each spectator is able to find certain narratives to engage
with while being free to discard others.lxxxii For Trump, this sheer multitude of often
mutually conflicting “canons” perpetuated and shared through social media invited his
followers to negotiate their standing within this plurality of conflicts,  creating in the
process their own, competing depictions of their candidate. A prevalent example of this
was his repeated characterization by his fans as an “alpha,” in opposition to the “beta
male” status of his opponents. This type of imagery was deployed, for example, in the
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YouTube video “Donald Trump: The return of the alpha male,” which begins with clips of
attacks against  Trump by his  opponents before culminating with swelling music  and
announcements  of  his  primary  victories  and  clips  of  his  rivals  suspending  their
campaigns.lxxxiii In an article in the Washington Post, Melissa Deckman characterized this
“alpha male” appeal as one of the primary reasons why Trump’s supporters continued to
side  with  him  throughout  the  many  upheavals  of  the  election.lxxxiv This  masculine
yearning can also be seen at  work across  social  media  in  2016 in the spread of  the
pejorative “cuck” as the go-to insult,  aimed initially at  his  conservative rivals  (in its
longer form, “cuckservative”) but eventually other political rivals as well.  The phrase
refers to cuckold pornography, where the typically white, submissive husband watches in
humiliation  as  his  wife  engages  in  sexual  activity  with  a  more  virile,  often  African
American male.lxxxv The word “cuck” alone therefore contains an entire narrative within
it, exhibiting a larger understanding of a world in which both women and minorities have
broken loose and are together taking advantage of the white man.
29 As part of the transformative process by which Donald Trump was assigned the identity
of an “alpha male,” he became involved in other narrative formations as well. His self-
portrayal as the “I alone can fix it” hero invited his supporters to imagine him as the
cowboy  riding  into  the  town  of  Washington,  D.C.  to  clean  it  of  its  corruption.lxxxvi
According to Robert B. Morris, integral elements of this kind of cowboy mythos have
included the lifting of the “I” into a position of ultimate good in a display of masculine
individualism and the struggle against a threatening wilderness. This characterization of
cowboy is minimally invested in the world he comes to inhabit, as he “rides into town as a
mysterious loner and after his adventure is complete, he disappears off into the sunset
alone as before.”lxxxvii The cowboy himself has merely the faintest figment of history and
future, as what matters to his narrative is the change he can enact in the present. For
Trump’s supporters, his precise biographical history likewise appeared insignificant next
to the faint figment of history being exhibited by his present self-claimed status as a
billionaire (and thus successful) businessman. In Trump’s social media, the change he was
to enact was represented best by the hashtag #DrainTheSwamp, a political slogan going
back to Ronald Reagan (and beyond).lxxxviii In a temporal sense, this simple slogan carries
with it the sense of a muddied and corrupt past, the dire state of the present demanding
immediate action, and the anticipation of a future in which the candidate has ridden into
town  and  fixed  everything.  The  way  in  which  Donald  Trump  was  imbued  with  the
qualities  of  “alpha  male”  or  “cowboy”  (or,  for  instance,  “lion”)lxxxix involved  the
transformative properties of fan fiction, by which certain traits are ascribed to characters
who might not exhibit them in other narrative contexts. As such, these characterizations
of Trump served to exhibit the described narratives rather than embody them, the latter
more readily assuming full conformation to the traits of the narrative and the former
suggesting a more loose and even playful relationship, where certain facets of both the
narrative conventions involved and Trump himself  could more easily be discarded in
favor of the faint idea of the narrative.
30 Trump himself employed this manner of narrativization by employing labels and insults
against his political foes in order to overwhelm their narratives with his own. Describing
Marco Rubio as “Little Marco,” Ted Cruz as “Lyin’ Ted,” and Jeb Bush as “Low Energy Jeb,”
Trump assigned to them roles similar to ones found in professional wrestling, effectively
limiting  their  narrative  maneuvering  by  turning  them  into  one-dimensional  side-
characters in his own story. Of these, “Crooked Hillary” stood apart as most clearly being
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a  title  of  the  villain  of  the  story,  with  the  “crookedness”  emphasizing  not  only  the
characteristics of corruption and criminal misgivings pushed by the Trump campaign, but
also physical deformity. The permeation of this characterization can be gleaned through
a June 2016 HuffPost/YouGov poll which asked the participants to describe Clinton and
Trump with adjectives of their choosing. While the five top words for both candidates had
negative  connotations,  Clinton’s  were  more  directly  villainous  (liar/lying,  dishonest,
crook/crooked, untrustworthy, and criminal). In contrast, Trump’s (arrogant, racist, ass/
asshole,  idiot/idiotic,  loud/loudmouth)  were—with  the  very  strong  exception  of
“racist”—the kinds of attributes one could much more easily also ascribe to a flawed
protagonist or a successful contestant in a reality television series.xc 
 
6. Conclusions
31 Arguing that the allure of Donald Trump might have to do with the success of anti-hero
narratives in contemporary popular culture,  Julian Zelizer wrote that,  “Americans no
longer expect virtuous protagonists. For almost two decades, Americans have been tuning
in to cheer on the antihero on television, on acclaimed series from ‘The Sopranos’ to
‘Breaking Bad’ – and dozens more. We watch characters who do whatever is necessary to
make things happen.”xci Whether Donald Trump appeared as a regular hero or an anti-
hero to his supporters likely varied on the extent to which they found his rhetoric and
actions morally questionable.  Nonetheless,  there was a transgressiveness to his allure
that appeared more at home in the realm of anti-heroes than of heroes. It was this quality
that allowed him the elasticity to exist in vastly contradictory narrative positions, even
simultaneously. Social media in 2016 election thus became a site of transformation and
transgression,  allowing the narratives spun around political  events and candidates to
transcend the mundane conventionalities of politics-as-usual and to truly enter a realm
of fantastic struggle over the heart and soul of the nation, where one’s opponents were
evil and vile and where traditional norms of political campaigning were only barriers to
be broken in service of history. 
32 While the notion of politics as a struggle between good and evil has appeared before—
Jeffrey C. Alexander has characterized this as the propensity of U.S. politics to operate in
binariesxcii—the  logic  of  networked  media  allowed  this  struggle  to  escape  the  more
carefully orchestrated milieus of  previous campaigns and assume a life of  its  own in
settings that were much less easily controlled. Similar to the act of telling narratives,
there was a performative aspect to social media use by which each tweet, picture, or
comment not only sought to exert a level of influence or power over the proceedings, but
also served to develop the user’s own credentials in their favored online community.
With different sites having a vested interest in inspiring their users to share content and
communicate in specific ways, the game-like elements of rewarding with likes and follows
those types of  content found favorable by specific communities incentivized users to
engage in perpetuating narratives that had been found resonant by their groups of like-
minded peers.xciii In this system, taking part in formulating specific narratives became a
form of currency online, with popular tropes serving as easy ways of conveying ideas to
groups who shared the same signs of communication. As users took to narrating events
taking place on the campaign trail—in accordance with their own understanding as well
as ideas they had absorbed from their peers and their valued news sources—they often
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transformed them in ways that involved assigning to people or events characteristics that
had a “larger-than-life” quality. 
33 Meanwhile, time held a fundamentally paradoxical status in social media, as the present
was turned into a constant flood of  updates,  news,  and commentary,  inviting one to
discard the past  in favor of  observing the latest  developments.xciv In the fragmented
context of social media, the historic past assumed the form of an uneasy figment that was
performatively conjured into being by each specific act of communication, often either
divorced from context that would give it  coherent meaning or inserted into settings
where  it  could  be  mobilized  with  specific  narrative  purposes.  Ganaele  Langlois  has
described  this  as  “a  breakdown  of  the  transition  from signification  to  sense:  media
creates a proliferation of signs, but these signs fail to make sense.”xcv As such, on one
hand these signs became open fodder to be subsumed into new political and narrative
configurations, and on the other the very act of producing these signs became valuable in
itself,  regardless  of  their  meaning  or  significance.  Heidi  Herzogenrath-Amelung  has
drawn on this notion in her criticism of how the urgency of Twitter commonly invites one
to action in the immediacy of the present while leaving unattended more deeply veiled,
systematic  issues  that  would  require  sustained  attention  across  time.xcvi In  a  similar
fashion, as we have seen, the very act of saying carried more importance for some users
in the 2016 elections than what was being said. 
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ABSTRACTS
In  the  2016  election,  social  media  became  an  increasingly  important  site  for  building,
transforming,  and  contesting  political  narratives.  As  part  of  this,  the  candidates  and  their
supporters engaged in creating and sharing narratives that spanned from an imagined past to
the  present  and  onward  to  an  anticipated  future.  This  article  examines  the  transformative
processes that took place in social media around these narratives and how they were imbued
with fantastic, larger-than-life heroic and villainous properties in a fashion similar to the process
of producing fan fiction. Looking at how social media operated as a network of varied public
imaginations,  the  article  explores  the  distinct  temporalities  around  Hillary  Clinton,  Bernie
Sanders, and Donald Trump and explicates how different media logics influenced the ways that
the  past,  the  present,  and  the  future  were  mobilized  in  narrative  formations  around  each
candidate.
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